
































The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 






Full agreement and the provision of  
threshold public goods 
 
Federica Alberti 
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Straβe 10, Jena, 
Germany. Email: alberti@econ.mpg.de 
 
Edward J. Cartwright 
School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, 
CT2 7NP, UK. Email: E.J.Cartwright@kent.ac.uk 
 
Keywords: Public good, threshold, full agreement, focal point, experiment, coordination. 
JEL Categories: C72, H41. 
 
Abstract 
We report threshold public good experiments in which group members not only need to be 
individually willing to contribute enough to provide the public good but also have to agree 
with each other on what every group members should contribute. We find strong support to 
the hypothesis that full agreement  increases successful provision, although  it takes a few 
repetitions before group members can successfully coordinate. This is consistent with our 
theoretical results that full agreement works because it increases criticality of each individual 
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1. Introduction 
A threshold public good is provided if and only if contributions reach a certain threshold. The 
classic example would be a capital fundraising project where, say, $10 million is needed to 
build a new school, cancer unit or theatre (Andreoni 1998). The potential applications of the 
threshold public good concept are, however, far more general than this archetypal case. For 
instance, the fixed costs associated with running any charity, or other group activity, require a 
minimum (but often quite large) amount be reached to make the activity viable (Bagnoli and 
McKee 1991). Political bargaining also provides a setting where success on, say, a climate 
change bill often requires a critical threshold of voters or countries to contribute (McEvoy 
2010).  
In  principle,  threshold  public  goods  are  not  subject  to  the  problems  typically 
associated with public goods. In particular, there is no strategic incentive to free ride, and so 
no tension between individual rationality and social efficiency. Group members do, however, 
need to coordinate in order to provide the public good, because there are many ways to split 
the  cost  of  the  public  good,  or  equivalently,  multiple  Nash  equilibrium.  Experimental 
evidence  suggests  that  groups  are  not  good  at  doing  so;  the  success  rate  of  providing 
threshold public goods is typically around 30-60 percent and well short of the efficient 100 
percent level we might like to see (Croson and Marks 2000). This is potentially very costly to 
the group. It is also intriguing when one takes into account the evidence that people are 
remarkably good at coordinating in other contexts. In particular, we know that groups can 
coordinate well when there is no conflict of interest and a focal point that aids coordination 
(Schelling 1960; Mehta et al. 1994; Bardsley et al. 2010).  
   In  the  standard  threshold  public  good  game,  considered  in  the  literature,  group 
members make individual contributions towards the public good. All, therefore, an individual 
decides,  or  can  communicate,  is  his  or  her  contribution,  e.g.  ‘I  will  contribute  $15’.  In 
applications, however, one observes the potential for more complex strategies. For instance, a 
group member may suggest what everyone in the group should do, e.g. ‘we should each 
contribute $15’, or ‘David and I should each contribute $15 and the rest of you contribute 
$25’. Alternatively, a group member may make their contribution conditional on others, e.g. 
‘I will contribute $15 if everyone else contributes $15’, or ‘I will contribute $15 if David 
contributes $25’. Our objective in this paper is to question whether such strategies are a help 
or hindrance in groups providing the public good. 
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  The  strategies  discussed  above  can  have  two  effects  on  the  way  group  members 
interact. First, they can be a means for individuals to  communicate more with each other 
because an individual can say what he or she thinks others should do. Second, they may 
change  the  rules  governing  public  good  provision  because  agreement  is  needed  if 
contributions  are  made  conditional  on  what  others  will  do.  This  latter  possibility  is 
particularly interesting because it means the group’s task has become more difficult: group 
members not only need to be individually willing to contribute enough to provide the good 
but also need to agree with each other on what they should contribute. Even so, we shall 
argue that this can help groups coordinate.  
    We shall argue that the main reason agreement can help groups coordinate is that it 
increases the criticality of each individual’s decision and makes a player more confident that 
other player’s will  not exploit his willingness to contribute. Criticality can only  succeed, 
though, if group members know what is expected of them. This is much more likely if there 
is a focal point around which to coordinate. In short, criticality makes every individual feel as 
though  their  decision  is  necessary  in  order  to achieve  a  successful  outcome  while  the 
existence  of  a  focal  point  makes  it  possible  for  the  group  members  to  successfully 
coordinate. We shall argue theoretically that the need for agreement leads to the increased 
prominence  of  an  equal  split  focal  point.  This  motivates  our  main  hypothesis:  that  a 
requirement  of  full  agreement  can  increase  criticality  and  lead  to  increased  success  at 
providing the public good. We test this hypothesis experimentally and find support for it. Our 
experimental  approach  allows  us  to  distinguish  whether  communication  or  the  need  for 
agreement is more important in aiding coordination, and we will come down strongly on the 
side of the need for agreement. 
  We proceed as follows: In section 2 we introduce threshold public good games. In 
section 3 we provide our main theoretical results. In section we describe our experimental 
design and in section 5 provide the experimental results. In section 6 we conclude. Additional 
material is provided in an appendix.  
 
2. Threshold public good games 
We shall begin by describing what we shall call the standard game. This is the standard game 
as considered in most of the prior literature when looking at simultaneous threshold public 
good games (e.g. Suleiman and Rapoport 1992, Cadsby et al. 2008). We shall then contrast 
this game with three other games that progressively differ in the feedback given to players, 
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the strategy set, and the payoff function. The differences are summarized in table 1. In all the 
games  we  shall  consider  there  is  a  set  of  n  players             .  Each  player         is 
endowed with    units of a private good where    is some positive integer. If          for all 
        then we say the game is symmetric. Otherwise we say that it is asymmetric. There 
also exist positive integers    and   that we shall refer to respectively as the threshold and the 
value of the public good. 
In the standard game, independently and simultaneously all players must decide how 
much of their endowment to contribute towards a public good. The strategy set of any player 
       is, thus, the set of integers                . Let         denote the contribution of 
player       and let         
 
     denote total contributions. If total contributions equal or 
exceed the threshold T then each player receives an additional   units of the private good. 
We also say that the group was successful in providing the public good. If contributions are 
below the threshold each contribution is refunded and if contributions are above the threshold 
no money is rebated. The payoff of player i is, thus,  
               
                         
                 
                                           
At the end of the game each player is told total contributions,  , but is not told the individual 
breakdown of contributions.  A  standard game  with feedback  is the same  as the standard 
game, just described, except that players are informed at the end of the game on the list of 
individual  contributions         .  The  difference  between  a  standard  game  and  standard 
game with feedback is considered by Croson and Marks (1998). 
In a game with communication the strategy set of a player is different to that in a 
standard game or standard game with feedback, but all other details remain largely same. 
More specifically, independently and simultaneously all players must decide on a vector of 
contributions saying how much they think each player should contribute towards the public 
good.  The  strategy  set  of  any  player          is,  thus,                 .  Let       
                 denote the vector of contributions chosen by player      , where     is the 
amount that player i ‘suggests’ player j should contribute. Let          be the amount that 
player i is willing to contribute and, as before, let         
 
     denote total contributions. The 
payoff function remains the same as in the standard game, equation (1). Thus, it is only the 
value of    that has any direct bearing on the game and the value of     for       is effectively 
cheap  talk.  At  the  end  of  the  game  players  are  informed  on  the  vector of  contributions 
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suggested by each player. Even though, therefore, the value of     for       is cheap talk it is 
a means of communication between players. 
In  a  full  agreement  game  the  strategy  set  is  the  same  as  that  in  a  game  with 
communication but the payoff function is different. The public good is provided if and only if 
total contributions equal or exceed the threshold and all players choose the same strategy. 
Full agreement on the vector of contributions is, thus, required. This means that every player 
must  agree  on  what  every  other  player  should  contribute,             for  any           .
1 
Formally, the payoff function of player i can be written  
                 
                                             
                 
                
At the end of the game players are informed on the vector of contributions suggested by each 
player, as in a game with communication. 
   
Table 1: Comparison of the four games we shall consider. 
Type of game  Strategy set  Feedback  Public good provided 
Standard   Own contribution.  Total contributions.  Achieve threshold 
Standard with 
feedback 














Achieve threshold and all agree 
on a vector of contributions 
    
We finish this section by introduction some notation and assumptions that will prove 
useful in the remainder of the paper. Let                 and let            . Informally, we 
can think of    as the maximum that player   can or will be willing to contribute, and   as 
the  maximum  that  all  players  can  or  will  contribute.  We  shall  use                and 
             to denote, respectively, the amount that could be and is contributed by players 
other than  . Finally, We shall assume throughout the following that       and         for 
all       .  Thus,  it  is  socially  efficient  to  provide  the  public  good  and  players  could  in 
principle split the cost of providing the public good equally.  
 
                                                             
1 Note that this does not in any way imply symmetry of contributions,          . 
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3. Nash equilibria, criticality and focal points 
All of the four games defined above have a large set of Nash equilibria that can be broadly 
distinguished into two categories: a set of equilibria where the sum of contributions match the 
threshold, and a set of where the sum of contributions are well below the threshold. In this 
section we shall formally define the set of equilibria for each game and discuss possible ways 
in which one of the equilibria may be selected or appear more focal.  
We shall start with the standard game, and standard game with feedback. In these 
games,  strategy  profile             is  a  Nash  equilibrium  if  and  only  if              
             for  all          .
2  It  is  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium  if  and  only  if              
            for all                  . One can easily derive that strategy profile           is a 
strict Nash equilibrium with public good provision if and only if 
                                  
The payoff of player   is            . Thus, any, ceteris paribus, change in her strategy would 
strictly lower her payoff, either to    if she decreases her contribution or to            
  if she 
increases  her contribution to   
 . The assumption that      , guarantees the existence of 
several such equilibria. Alternatively, strategy profile           is a Nash equilibrium with 
no public good provision if and only if 
                                             
At least one such equilibria will exist if        for all      . In this case, player   receives 
payoff    and no, ceteris paribus, change in her strategy would change her payoff. This latter 
point means that every perfect Nash equilibrium  is a Nash equilibrium with public good 
provision (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989).  
Most theories of learning would suggest play should converge on a Nash equilibrium 
with public good provision if there is sufficient repetition. This is not, however, what we 
observe empirically. Typically, we observe contributions fluctuating around the threshold, 
even  if there was  a previous  instance where the threshold was  met exactly (Cadsby  and 
Maynes 1999). Alberti, Cartwright and Stepanova (2011) use impulse balance theory to make 
sense of such empirical results. Impulse balance theory weights the impulse to contribute less 
with the impulse to contribute enough to provide the public good and can explain observed 
deviations from Nash equilibrium. In doing so, it predicts that the expected ‘ex-post’ impulse 
                                                             
2 Where            denotes the payoff of player   if she contributes    and the contributions of others are 
denoted    .  
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to change contribution will be relatively high. What we shall do here, is connect this with the 
idea of criticality.  
3.1 Lack of criticality in the standard game 
Criticality and perceived criticality has been analysed in detail in binary threshold public 
good games, i.e. games where a player must contribute either zero or her entire endowment 
(e.g. Rapoport 1987; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy  1989;  Au, Chen and  Komorita 1998; De 
Cremer and van Dijk 2002). In this setting, a player is critical if her contribution is necessary 
and  sufficient  for  the  provision  of  the  public  good,  and  perceived  criticality  appears  to 
correlate with the decision to contribute. In binary games criticality is relatively simple to 
define. In non binary games, like we are considering here, criticality is harder to define, but 
probably no less relevant in trying to model behaviour. The definition of criticality we shall 
introduce here is one of criticality of the last unit contributed. Specifically, given strategy 
profile          , in the standard game, we say that the last unit contributed by player   was 
critical if and only if      . This definition extends the idea of criticality from binary games 
in a natural way to non-binary games.  
Clearly, a player can only know ex-post whether or not the last unit contributed was 
critical. It is, therefore, most relevant to concentrate on the probability or expectation that the 
last unit contributed will be critical. In order to estimate this probability we need a model of 
how players behave. The model suggested by Alberti, Cartwright and Stepanova (2011) is to 
assume that each player independently contributes each unit of the private good (up to a 
maximum of  ) with some probability  . Contributions to the public good are thus described 
by a binomial distribution       . This approximates relatively well observed contributions 
and relates nicely to the standard way of modelling behaviour in binary games.
3 For any 
player  , the probability distribution over the contributions of others,    , is given by 
                    
 
                                                     
If player   expects the contributions of others to be distributed as in equation (3) then 
we can obtain an upper bound on the probability that the last unit she contributes will be 
critical.  If           or              then  the  last  unit  contributed  by  player     cannot  be 
critical.  An  upper  bound  on  criticality  is  thus  given  by,  what  we  shall  call,  maximum 
criticality,  
                                                             
3 It naturally accounts for differences in endowment as those with a larger endowment will be expected to 
contribute more. 
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Maximum criticality provides a, potentially tight, upper bound on the probability the last unit 
contributed by a player will be critical. Our first result gives a reduced form expression of 
maximum criticality.  
Proposition  1:  If  player     believes  that  contributions  to  the  public  good  by  others  are 
described by binomial distribution          then  






                                     
     
     
 
        
   
                                      
     
 
 
   
      
 
      
    
   
                         
  
Proof: If         then we can set       and obtain                            Next note 
that if        , for any                      the 
   




   
 
 
    
 
   
 
     
                      
Equation (4) is U shaped and so maximum criticality is obtained when either            or 
         . Furthermore, equation (4) is symmetric and so maximum criticality is obtained at 
           if and only if                      .  
We see from Proposition 1 that maximum criticality can be one. This will be the case 
if         and so the public good can only be provided if player   contributes something. In 
general, however, Proposition 1 implies that maximum criticality will be less than one, and 
potentially near to zero. To illustrate, Table 2 details maximum criticality in six different five 
player games. Note that these coincide with the games we shall consider experimentally, and 
what we have called the benchmark game is indeed the benchmark game in the literature (e.g. 
Cadsby et al. 2008).
4 Maximum criticality  is high enough to justify a player contributing 
something, because         . This, however, is to be expected given that there exists strict 
Nash equilibria with public good provision. In absolute terms maximum criticality is low. 
Crucially,  this  means  that  with  high  probability  a  player  will  know  the  last  unit  they 
contribute is not critical. The analysis of Alberti, Cartwright and Stepanova (2011) uses the 
resultant ex-post impulse to predict likely success at providing the public good. The point we 
                                                             
4 In the benchmark game most observed contributions are an exact multiple of 5. The * games are, therefore, 
potentially more representative of how subjects perceive the game by revaluing parameters in multiples of 5. 
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want to pick up on here, is that a lack of criticality is the best explanation we have for why 
contributions do not converge on a Nash equilibrium in the standard game.  
 
Table 2: Maximum criticality in six different five player games. 
Game 
Endowment  V  T  Maximum criticality 
Players 1-3  Players 4-5      Players 1-3  Players 4-5 
Benchmark*   11  11  10  25  0.129  0.129 
Asymmetric*  9  14  10  25  0.133  0.136 
Very 
asymmetric *  5  20  10  25  0.180  0.376 
Benchmark   55  55  50  125  0.058  0.058 
Asymmetric  45  70  50  125  0.061  0.062 
Very 
asymmetric  25  100  50  125  0.086  0.369 
 
 
If low criticality is the reason why groups fail to converge on a Nash equilibrium, and 
the reason why they fail to providing public goods, then increasing criticality is a potentially 
good way to increase efficiency (De Cremer and van Dijk 2002). So far, we have focussed on 
criticality  in  the  standard  game.  The  argument  we  have  used,  however,  in  particular 
Proposition 1, would apply equally to a game with communication. What about criticality in a 
game with full agreement? A-priori, one can argue that criticality in this game could be more 
or less than in a standard game. One could argue less, because player   can only have any 
influence on the outcome of a full agreement game if the other       players agree; if this is 
unlikely to happen then player  ’s strategy, or proposed vector of contributions, is unlikely to 
be critical. If the public good is provided, however, then any change in player  ’s strategy 
would have meant the public good would not have been provided. This suggests that player 
 ’s strategy  is highly critical. To progress further on this  issue we need a  model of  how 
players may behave in a full agreement game.   
 
3.2 Focal points in a full agreement game 
The set of Nash equilibria in a full agreement game is very similar to those in a standard 
game. In a full agreement game, strategy profile             is a strict Nash equilibrium if 
                             for all                     . One can easily derive that strategy 
profile             is a strict Nash equilibrium with public good provision if and only if 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 06310 
 
                                                     
Note the additionally requirement here, when compared to the standard game, that all players 
should  agree.  As  in  the  standard  game,  there  are  Nash  equilibrium  with  no  public  good 
provision but we omit the details here. The question we need to address is whether play can 
reasonably converge on a Nash equilibrium with public good provision.  
Clearly play can only converge on a Nash equilibrium if all players agree. This leaves 
players with a coordination game  not unlike the  matching games discussed  by  Schelling 
(1960) and Sugden (1993, 1995) such as ‘write a positive number’.
5 Evidence suggests that 
players can solve such coordination problems, with team reasoning or collective rationality 
being  the  leading  explanation  of  how  they  do  so  (Sugden  1993,  1995;  Bacharach  2006; 
Mehta et al. 1994; Isoni et al 2011). The basic idea behind collective rationality  is that a 
player  will  recognize  a  common  interest  in  trying  to  coordinate  on  some  equilibrium 
(Schelling 1960). Thus, players look for a decision rule that if followed by all is most likely 
to produce successful coordination; ‘less ambiguous’ and ‘more obvious’ rules should tend to 
be favoured (Sugden 1995). The pertinent question for us is whether players can solve the 
particular coordination problem that arises in the game with full agreement. To address this 
question we shall draw on the theory of focal points due to Sugden (1995).
6  
  Imagine someone giving advice to a player on how much to contribute or what vector 
of contributions to suggest in a threshold public good game. The advice will consist of a 
decision rule and can be interpreted as a comprehensive plan to play the game; we shall have 
more to say on this shortly. A recommendation               details a decision rule    for 
every player       . A recommendation   is said to be collectively rational if there exist 
payoffs   
      
  such that (i) if every player       follows her advice    then expected 
payoffs are given by   
      
 , and (ii) if some player       does not follow her advice    
then, whatever the decision rule of the other players, the expected utility of any player       
is strictly less than   
 .
7 There can be at most one collectively rational recommendation (and 
typically  there  is  no  collectively  rational  recommendation).  Sugden  (1995)  convincingly 
                                                             
5 One important difference is that different Nash equilibria give a different distribution of payoffs in a 
threshold public good game but not a matching game. Isoni et al. (2011) also investigate non-pure 
coordination problems, in which there are many different Nash equilibria and in which different players earn 
different payoffs.  
6 Other theories of collective rationality are due to Bacharach (1993), Janssen (1993), and Casajus (2001). 
7 This definition is a reduced form of the definition given by Sugden (1995).  Sugden (1995) allows that advice 
be conditional on a player’s private description of the game and that it can consist of a set of acceptable 
decision rules. Note also that Sugden (1995) considers a game with two players and we consider the natural 
extension to more than two players. 
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argues that if a collectively rational recommendation exists then each player should act on 
that recommendation.  
  The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in a threshold public good game means that there 
will  not  exist  a  collectively  rational  recommendation  if  players  have  perfect  information 
about the game.  We need to consider, therefore, some ex-ante stage in which each player has 
some private knowledge. This can capture inherent uncertainty and ambiguity. The approach 
we  shall  take  is  to  assume  that  (a)  player  identity  is  private  information,  and  (b)  player 
endowment is private information. So, player 1, does not know that player 2 is called player 
2, and does not know that player 2 has endowment   . Note that each player does know the 
number of players in the game, does know the distribution of endowments across players, and 
does know own endowment. To understand these assumptions it is useful to discuss decision 
rules in more detail.  
In the standard game one can think of a decision rule as a contribution or set of 
contributions. Thus,        , and player   is advised to randomly choose a contribution from 
set   . For example, the advice might be ‘contribute 25’,          , or ‘contribute something 
between 25 and 35’,               . In this case, the fact that player identity and player 
endowment is private information is irrelevant because a player only has control over her 
own contribution. Analogously, in a full agreement game one can think of a decision rule as a 
vector  of  contributions  or  set  of  vector  of  contributions.  Thus,         ,  and  player    is 
advised to randomly choose a vector of contributions from set   . For example, the advice 
might be ‘split the cost equally’ 
  
      
 
 
   
 
 
   
or ‘contribute zero and split the cost amongst others’, which if       gives  
         
 
     
   
 
     
    
Consider next the advice ‘let someone else contribute zero and split the cost amongst others’. 
That this advice is given in a context where identity is private information means it must be 
ambiguous who the ‘someone else’ will be. The advice, therefore, if      , equates to 
       
 
     
     
 
     
   
 
     
 
 
     
     
 
     
     
 
     
   
 
     
      
The  crucial  point to  recognise  here  is  that  the  fact  player  identity  is  private  information 
constrains how specific advice can be. The advice ‘split the cost equally’ is unambiguous 
because there is only one way to do this, but the advice ‘let someone else contribute zero and 
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split  the  cost  amongst  others’  is  ambiguous  because  there  are         potential  ‘someone 
elses’. Recall that collective rationality will favour decision rules that are less ambiguous and 
more obvious. This is captured by our next result. 
Proposition 2: In a standard game, standard game with feedback, and communication game, 
there  is  no  collectively  rational  recommendation.  In  a  full  agreement  game  there  is  a 




       
 
     
 
   
  
The collectively rational recommendation is to split the cost equally,        
      
 ). 
Proof: Consider a standard game and suppose that               is a collectively rational 
recommendation. Without loss of generality we can assume    consists of a single strategy 
       . If players follow the recommendation then payoffs are either   
                for all 
 ,  or    
        for  all   .  Let     denote  the  set  of  strict  Nash  equilibria  with  public  good 
provision. We know, because       , that the set   contains at least two equilibria. This 
means that there exists a strategy profile               that differs from  , in the sense that 
        for at least one player      . If players play this Nash equilibrium then payoffs are 
  
                     for all  . If         then clearly   
      
 . If         then either   
       
in which case   
      
  or there exists some       such that          and   
      
 . Either way, if 
players behave according to           rather than   at least one player will receive a strictly 
higher payoff. This contradicts   being a collectively rational recommendation. A similar 
argument can be used in the standard game with feedback and communication game. 
  Now  consider  a  full  agreement  game  and  the  recommendation  to  split  the  cost 
equally. If players follow this recommendation then they will play a strict Nash equilibrium 
with public good provision. Payoffs will be given by   
            
 
       for all  . We need 
to rule out the possibility that a player could expect to do better than this. To consider one 
alternative, suppose that player    chooses strategy          
 
      
 
    . If every player 
chooses the same strategy as player   then the payoff of any player       drops to   
        
   
 
        
 , but the payoff of player   increases to   
               
 . The payoff gain is 
clearly 
 
 . If there exists a player   who chooses           then the payoff of every player 
      drops to   
           
 . Now, suppose that player   uses the decision rule, ‘contribute 
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zero and split the cost amongst others’,           . Suppose that every other player       
uses the decision rule ‘let someone else contribute zero and split the cost amongst others’, for 
example, 
         
 
     
   
 
     
   
 
     
 
 
     
     
 
     
      
 
     
   
 
     
      
  The expected payoff of player   is greater than   
  if 
      
 
     
 
   




This  is  ruled  out  by  assumption.  There  are  many  other  possible  deviations  from  the 
recommendation. Reflection, however, shows that the deviation we have considered is the 
most likely to increase the payoff of a player. Thus, split the cost equally is a collectively 
rational recommendation.   
Proposition 2 formalises the idea that in a full agreement game that ‘split the cost 
equally’ is less ambiguous and more obvious than any other possible decision rule in a full 
agreement  game.  Many  have  argued  that  split  the  cost  equally  is  an  obvious  solution  to 
threshold public good games and so it is no surprise that Proposition 2 picks this up. We 
know, however, that split the cost equally is not a good description of how players behave in 
the standard game (e.g. Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 1989; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992; 
Croson and Marks 2001; Coats et al. 2009). Instead we observe frequent deviations from the 
equal split. Interestingly, Proposition 2 also picks this up by demonstrating that ‘split the cost 
equally’ is not a collectively rational recommendation in the standard game. It is only in the 
full  agreement  game,  therefore,  that  the  equal  split  becomes  too  unambiguous  and  too 
obvious to miss. 
We have now done enough to state our main hypothesis. Let us briefly remind of the 
key points: In a standard game we expect that groups will be inefficient at providing the 
public  good.  Proposition  1  suggests  that  this  is  because  of  low  criticality.  To  increase 
efficiency we need, therefore, something to increase criticality. In a full agreement game 
players should feel critical if there is a realistic possibility of reaching agreement. Proposition 
2 suggests that there is a realistic possibility of reaching agreement because ‘split the cost 
equally’ is a collectively rational recommendation. This motivates our main hypothesis.    
Hypothesis  1:  Success  at  providing  the  public  good  will  be  higher  in  a  game  with  full 
agreement that in a standard game.  
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It is important to keep in mind that the conditions for providing the public good are much 
more  stringent  in  a  full  agreement  game  than  in  a  standard  game.  It  is  far  from  trivial, 
therefore, that Hypothesis 1 will hold. It will only hold if all players react to the change in 
incentives in the way we have predicted. It is an empirical question whether or not they do.
8  
  Before moving on to the experimental analysis we shall briefly revisit the role of 
endowment asymmetry and the assumptions that player identity and player endowment are 
private  information.  To  assume  that  player  identity  is  private  information  is  very  mild.
9 
Moreover, if the game is symmetric then the assumption that player endowments are private 
information is irrelevant. Proposition 2 applies, therefore, without any qualification to the 
symmetric  games  that  are  most  often  considered  in  the  literature.  In  asymmetric  games, 
however,  the  assumption  that  endowments  are  private  information  warrants  more 
consideration. To illustrate consider the decision rules in table 3 that are conditional on player 
endowments, are framed in terms of a coordination game with parameters corresponding to 
those in table 2. Decision rules ‘split the cost proportionally’ and ‘split the cost so payoffs are 
fair’  are  intuitive  but  only  possible  if  player  endowments  are  common  knowledge.  The 
assumption that player endowments are private information thus rules them out.  
 
Table 3: Decision rules. 
Decision rule  Benchmark  Asymmetric  Very asymmetric 
Equal split                                                       
Proportional split                     (21,21,21,31,31)  (11,11,11,46,46) 
Fair split                                                        
 
The  assumption  that  player  endowments  are  private  information  is,  therefore,  not 
innocuous.  Without  this  assumption,  however,  there  is  no  collectively  rational 
recommendation in the full agreement game, unless it is symmetric. The intuition for this 
being that there is no sense in which, say, the equal split is any less ambiguous or more 
obvious  than  the  proportional  split,  according  to  the  definition  of  a  collectively  rational 
                                                             
8 Some evidence to suggest they may is provided by van de Kragt et al. (1983). They showed that groups are 
very efficient at providing public goods if a minimal contributing set had been agreed in pre-play verbal 
communication. Evidence from the weak link game, however, gives reason to be less optimistic. The weak link 
game resembles the full agreement game in that coordination of all players is needed to achieve Pareto 
efficiency. Large inefficiency is typically observed.     
9 For instance, it seems unreasonable that were players to agree on the decision rule ‘someone contribute zero 
and split the cost amongst others’ they would all independently know who the ‘someone else’ should be. 
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recommendation.  One  could,  thus,  argue  that  it  may  be  harder  for  players  to  achieve 
agreement in an asymmetric game. Personally, however, we feel that this need not be the 
case. To motivate this view, one could consider a weaker notion of collectively rationality 
and argue that the equal split is ‘more obvious’ than, say, the proportional split (Janssen 
2006). This, however, seems somewhat ad-hoc and contrary to evidence in the psychology 
literature (van Dijk and Wilke 1993, 1995).
10 Our preferred view is to say that, even though 
player endowments are common knowledge, players  may  not focus on them or  may  not 
expect others to focus on them. One justification for this being that the equal split ‘works’ 
irrespective of endowments while things like a fair split and proportional split are conditional 
on endowments and so it makes sense to ignore endowments. This would be sufficient to 
justify  the  assumption  that  player  endowments  are  private  information,  and  is  not 
unreasonable given that players are asked to specify a vector of contributions (Harris and 
Joyce 1980). Proposition 2 can, therefore, reasonably be applied to asymmetric games.    
 
4. Experiment design   
As already mentioned, we consider Hypothesis 1 an empirical question and so now report on 
experiments  designed  to  evaluate  it.  In  the  experimental  design,  each  of  the  four  games 
presented in table 1 corresponds to a treatment.  Thus, our standard treatment corresponds to 
the standard game used in the threshold public goods literature. The standard treatment with 
feedback,  communication  treatment,  and  full  agreement  treatment  are  motivated  and 
described in more detail in Section 2. The main things to recall here are that, in the standard 
treatment and standard treatment with feedback subjects must simply decide how much of 
their endowment to contribute to the public good, while in the communication treatment and 
full agreement treatment subjects must decide on a vector of contributions specifying how 
much each group member should contribute to the public good. Moreover, in the standard 
treatment subjects are only informed at the end of the game of total contributions, while in 
the  standard  treatment  with  feedback  subjects  are  also  informed  of  the  breakdown  of 
contributions, and in the communication and full agreement treatments subjects are informed 
of  the  vectors  of  contributions  chosen  by  others.  A  screen  shot  for  the  full  agreement 
treatment is shown in the appendix. 
                                                             
10 The argument would be that there is only one way to split the cost equally but lots of ways to split the cost 
asymmetrically. There is, however, only one way to split the cost proportionally but lots of ways to split the 
cost non-proportionally. The stronger notion of a collectively rational recommendation avoids such problems. 
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Each experimental session was divided into three parts, as summarised in Table 4. In 
part 1, subjects played a game with parameters corresponding to those in the benchmark 
game, as  already  detailed  in Table 2,  for  10 rounds. In part 2 they played  a game with 
parameters corresponding to those in the asymmetric game for 10 rounds, and in part 3 they 
played a game with parameters corresponding to those in the very asymmetric game for a 
final  10  rounds.  The  type  of  game  played,  standard,  standard  with  feedback  or 
communication or full agreement, was the same in all three parts of a session.  Note that 
subjects retained their role within the group throughout a part. Thus, a subject endowed with, 
say, 70 in an asymmetric game was endowed with 70 in all 10 rounds. Also, each subject was 
randomly assigned a label, such as ‘player 1’, at the beginning of each part. This also was 
kept throughout the part. (No label was linked with a specific value of endowment, unlike 
what is shown in table 2, where ‘player 4’ and ‘player 5’ receive a higher endowment in 
asymmetric games and very asymmetric games.) 
The groups, of 5, were randomly assigned at the beginning of each part but remained 
fixed during the part. Fixed matching during each part of the session allows us to look for 
dynamic and learning effects as observed in previous threshold public good experiments (e.g. 
Cadsby  et  al.  2008).  The  use  of  three  different  sets of  parameters  allows  us  to  consider 
symmetric  and  asymmetric  games.  The  random  matching  between  parts  can  potentially 
alleviate  order  effects  from  subjects  playing,  for  example,  a  game  with  asymmetric 
endowments after experience of a game with symmetric endowments. We shall not, however, 
make  a  strong  case  for  this.  The  use  of  the  benchmark  parameters  in  part  1  allows  an 
unambiguous comparison of behaviour across treatments in the benchmark, symmetric case 
considered in the literature. Parts 2 and 3 allow us to compare behaviour across treatments as 
subjects are exposed to progressively more asymmetric endowments.    
 
Table 4: Experimental Design. 
Session 
Treatment  










5  Standard  Benchmark  Asymmetric  Very asymmetric  4 
2  Standard with 
feedback  Benchmark  Asymmetric  Very asymmetric  4 
3, 6, 7  Communication  Benchmark  Asymmetric  Very asymmetric  12 
1, 4, 8  Full agreement  Benchmark  Asymmetric  Very asymmetric  12 
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The experiments were run at the University of Kent involving subjects recruited from 
the general student population. The interactions were anonymous and the experiments were 
computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We took care to recruit subjects who had not 
taken  part  in  similar  experiments  before.  We  ran  8  sessions  in  all  giving  a  total  of  160 
subjects.
  11 Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the session an amount equal to their 
payoff over the 10 rounds multiplied by 1p for one of the three parts. The relevant part was 
randomly selected for each subject. Each session lasted about 40 minutes and the average 
payment was £6.55.
12 Full details of the instructions used for each treatment are provided in 
the appendix. At the end of each part subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire 
regarding their general experience in the 10 rounds. Subjects were not paid for answering the 
questionnaires but had to answer all of the questions in order to proceed with the experiment. 
The analysis of the questionnaire responses is beyond the scope of the current paper.  
 
5. Experimental results 
5.1 Overview of the results 
To give a first overall picture of the results, figure 1 plots the success rate at providing the 
public good over time in the four treatments, table 5 summarizes the success rate at providing 
the public good in the first five rounds and last five rounds in the four treatments, and table 6 
summarizes total contributions in the four treatments. Note that the average success rates and 
average contributions in the standard treatment are very similar to those observed in other 










                                                             
11 Note that six sessions were run with 20 subjects, whereas one session involved 25 subjects and another 
session had 15 subjects.  
12 There was no show-up fee. Instead, student participants were guaranteed a minimum earning of £5.00 per 
hour experiment. 
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Figure 1: Success rates in the four treatments. 
 
The most noticeable difference between treatments is in the dynamics of the success 
rate. Broadly speaking, the success rate appears stable or decreasing across the 10 rounds of 
each part in the standard treatment, standard treatment with feedback, and communication 
treatment, while it is increasing in the full agreement treatment. Indeed, in the first round of 
the full agreement treatment the success rate is consistently equal to zero. However, by the 
end of the ten rounds, the success rate reaches the level of 75% in part 1 and part 3 and the 
level of about 67% in part 2. (Notice that, across all treatments, 75% was the highest success 
rate in parts 1 and 3, and 67% was the second highest success in part 2.) We shall come back 
to these effects in more detail in Section 5.2.  
 
Table 5: Success rates over the ten rounds.  
   Success rate for provision % 
 













five  All 
 
Standard  55  40  47.5  40  75  57.5  25  50  37.5 
Standard with 
feedback  90  60  75  80  60  70  55  55  55 
 
Communication  73.3  53.3  63.3  50  53.3  51.7  33.3  28.3  30.8 
 






























FULL  COMM  STF  ST 
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It is also noteworthy that the success rate appears stable or decreasing across the three 
parts  in  the  standard  treatment,  standard  treatment  with  feedback,  and  communication 
treatment,  while  it  is  increasing  in  the  full  agreement  treatment.  This  contributes  to  the 
success rate in the full agreement treatment being relatively low in part 1 and relatively high 
in part 3. The thing that stands out in table 6 is the relatively high contributions in the full 
agreement treatment. It is also noticeable that total contributions are decreasing in all four 
treatments and that, in part 3, total contributions in the full agreement treatment are similar to 
those in the other treatments.
13  
 
Table 6: Group contributions over the ten rounds.  
   Average group contribution 
 













five  All 
Standard  133.5  123.8 
128.
6  128  134.4 
131.




feedback  156.3  131.8 
144.
1  135  126.9 
130.
7  126.3  122.7 
124.
5 
Communication  139.1  122.4 
130.
7  125  128.9 
126.
9  108.7  98.25 
103.
5 
Full agreement  165.7  159.5 
162.
6  154.3  151.4 
152.




  Before proceeding to a more formal analysis of the data we provide figure 2 which 
allows an alternative comparison between the full agreement treatment and the other three 
treatments.  It  shows  the  success  rate that  would  have  been  achieved  if  the  rules  for  the 
provision of the public good would have been the same in the full agreement treatment as the 
communication and standard treatments. That is, it shows the success rate that would have 
been achieved if we removed the need for agreement. We see that success rates would have 
been very high, especially in parts 1 and 2. Thus, any lack of success in the full agreement 
treatment comes for a lack of agreement and not an unwillingness to contribute. This allows 
us to reconcile the high contributions we observe in table 6 with the not so high success rate 
in table 5. Note also, that in part 3 the actual success rate in figure 1 more closely resembles 
the hypothetical success rate  in  figure 2. This  suggests that reaching agreement was  less 
difficult by part 3 than in parts 1 and 2.  
 
                                                             
13 Notice that, in all four treatments, total contributions are obtained by adding up own contributions as given 
even if the public good is not provided.  
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Figure 2: Success rate in the full agreement treatment if we removed the condition that all 
players must agree. 
 
5.2 Success rates 
In order to get a better idea whether there were significant differences between treatments in 
terms of the success at providing the public good over time we report results of a random-
effects probit regression with the probability of success as the dependent variable. In table 7 
we report estimates of two models in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if the group 
was successful and 0 otherwise. In the ‘first model’ we used four non-interactive independent 
variables including round number (round) and a dummy variable for each of the following 
treatments:  standard  with  feedback  (STF),  communication  (COMM),  and  full  agreement 
(FA).  We  also  used  the  following  interactive  independent  variables:  STF_round, 
COMM_round,  and  FA_round.  Note  that  this  implies  the  standard  treatment  is  the 
comparator  treatment.  By  removing  seemingly  insignificant  variables  we  obtain  the  ‘last 
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Table 7: Results of a random-effects probit regression of the probability of success, period 
number (period), treatments (STF, COMM, FULL), and interaction between period number 
and treatments (STF*Period, COMM*Period, FULL*Period). Standard errors in brackets; * 
indicates significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.  
   Part 1   Part 2   Part 3  


























STF     1.147 
(0.832)  _ 
 1.667*   
-0.949 
   2.566*** 
(0.761) 
1.031 
(-1.068)  _ 
 
COMM  1.05 
(-0.658)  _ 




  0.240 
(0.916)  _ 
 
FULL   -2.522*** 
(0.709) 
  -3.380*** 
(0.542) 
 -1.341 






STF*Period   -0.058 






(0.114)  _ 
 
COMM*Period  -0.098 






(-0.1)  _ 
 























No. of obs.   320  320  320  320  320  320 
No. of groups   32  32  32  32  32  32 
 
  The results in table 6 show a highly significant increasing success rate in the full 
agreement treatment in all parts.
14 By contrast, in part 1, the success rate is decreasing in the 
other three treatments; in part 2, it is increasing in the standard treatment but stable in the 
other two treatments; in part 3, it is stable in the other three treatments. This is clear evidence 
of the dynamic effect we previously noted in which there is a tendency for the success rate to 
increase in the full agreement treatment and not other treatments. On the other hand, the 
overall success rate in the full agreement treatment is lower than in the other treatments, and 
significantly so in part 1. The end result is a prediction of lower success rates in the full 
agreement treatment in earlier rounds but higher success rates by later rounds. By the end of 
part 3 success rates are predicted to be significantly higher in the full agreement treatment 
than in any other treatment.  
                                                             
14 In parts 1 and 3 this is clear from the coefficient on FULL*Period. In part 2 we need to recognise that the 
Period coefficient is highly significant and the FULL*Period not, and so success is again modelled as increasing. 
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  We see this as evidence consistent with hypothesis 1. Clearly, we see that subjects 
needed  time  to  learn  and  the  requirement  of  full  agreement  is  not  conducive  to  success 
without experience. With experience, however, success rates in the full agreement treatment 
were high, reaching an average over 70%, and higher than in other treatments. Also success 
was more lasting. We clearly see in figure 1, that success tended to be permanent in the full 
agreement  treatment  but  transitory  in  the  other  three  treatments.  Despite,  therefore,  the 
requirement of full agreement making it more difficult in principle for groups to provide the 
public good, we suggest that it can help them to succeed. We shall next question whether it 
did so for the reasons we suggested it might in Section 3.  
 
5.3 Individual choices 
To get a better idea of how criticality and focal points could make a difference in terms of 
increasing success rate in the full agreement treatment, in this section we compare choices 
made by subjects in the full agreement and communication treatments. Before doing this we 
note  that  feedback  and  communication  of  itself  appeared  to  make  little  difference.  In 
particular,  the  results  summarized  above  suggest  that  success  rates  in  the  full  agreement 
treatment had a  very different dynamic pattern  to those  in the communication treatment. 
Also,  success  rates  were  significantly  higher  in  the  full  agreement  treatment  than  the 
communication treatment after sufficient repetition. It is the requirement of full agreement, 
therefore, that appears to make the difference.  This appears consistent with our interpretation 
of Proposition 2, namely that full agreement focuses attention on the equal split focal point 
and thereby increases perceptions of criticality. 
  To  back  this  interpretation  up  we  can  consider  choices  made  by  subjects  who 
successfully coordinated with other group members in the last round of the full agreement 
treatment. These choices are summarized in table 8. Summing over individual contributions, 
total  contributions  were  just  equal  to  the  threshold  T  for  five  of  nine  groups  that  were 
successful in part 1, six of eight groups that were successful in part 2, and all nine successful 
groups in part 3. This suggests an increase in the efficiency of contributions from part 1 to 
part 3. The thing that stands out in table 7 is that most groups coordinated on the equal split, 
i.e. (25, 25, 25, 25, 25), even in parts 2 and 3 where player endowments were not identical.  
In part 1, all successful groups coordinated on a symmetric vector of contributions 
and most on the equal split. In part 2, one group did coordinate on the fair split (i.e. 15, 40, 
40, 15, 15), and another group coordinated on something close to the proportional split, i.e. 
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(19, 19, 19, 34, 34), while the other groups coordinated on a symmetric vector. In part 3, one 
group coordinated on again something close to the proportional split, i.e. (9, 49, 9, 49, 9), 
while the other eight groups coordinated on the equal split.
15 This suggests that the equal split 
was a strong focal point. It also suggests that in parts 2 and 3, where player endowments were 
asymmetric, subjects did not focus on endowments (or did not expect others to focus on the 
endowments). This is entirely consistent with Proposition 2.  
 
Table 8: Coordination rules in round 10.  
Part 1  Part 2  Part 3 
Group   Choice  Group   Choice  Group   Choice 
1  (30, 30, 30, 30, 30)  13  __  25  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
2  (55, 55, 55, 55, 55)  14  (45, 45, 45, 45, 45)  26  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
3  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  15  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  27  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
4  __  16  (40, 40, 40, 40, 40)  28  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
5  (30, 30, 30, 30, 30)  17  __  29  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
6  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  18  (15, 40, 40, 15, 15)  30  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
7  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  19  __  31  __ 
8  __  20  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  32  __ 
9  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  21  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  33  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
10  (40, 40, 40, 40, 40)  22  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  34  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) 
11  (25, 25, 25, 25, 25)  23  __  35  (9, 49, 9, 49, 9) 
12  __  24  (19, 19, 19, 34, 34)  36  __ 
 
 
  To further explore the role of criticality and focal points we compare choices made by 
subjects in the first round and in the last round of the full agreement and communication 
treatments. Figure 3 shows the number of subjects suggesting an equal contribution, that is 
choosing a symmetric vector of contributions, in the relevant round of the full agreement and 
communication  treatments.  Notice  that  each  treatment  involved  60  subjects,  so  the 
frequencies in one treatment can be directly compared to those in the other treatment. There 
are two key observations we would  make with  regard to figure 3. First, we see that the 
proportion  of  subjects  choosing  an  equal  contribution  in  the  full  agreement  treatment  is 
significantly  higher  than  in  the  communication  treatment,  for  both  rounds  and  all  parts. 
                                                             
15 Notice that, in part 3, not only the equal share of the cost but also the endowment of three of five group 
members was equal to 25. So perhaps (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) was even more obvious choice than it was in part 2. 
However, one should also notice that (25, 25, 25, 25, 25) was also chosen in part 2, where player endowments 
were equal to 45 and 70.  
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Second, the proportion of subjects choosing an equal contribution is relatively stable between 
rounds 1 and 10 in the full agreement (and communication treatment).  
These two observations are exactly what we would expect given our interpretation of 
Proposition 2. The first observation is consistent with the equal split being more focal in the 
full agreement game that in the communication game. The second observation is important in 
understanding the dynamics of play in the full agreement game. In particular, it suggests that 
the  increasing success rate we observe  in the  full agreement treatment  is due to a small 
number of subjects learning how to coordinate with the majority, and not so more complex 
learning dynamic. A large number of subjects chose the equal split in the first round and it 
just takes time for other members of the group to coordinate with this. Arguably, therefore, 
what subjects need to learn is not the equal split but criticality.  
  We  also  looked  at the  distributions  of  unequal  contribution  choices  including  the 
proportional split and the fair split in the two treatments. For the communication treatment, 
these distributions appear to be highly dispersed (i.e. either perfectly- or nearly-uniform), 
equally  for  the  first  round  and  the  last  round  within  each  part.  For  the  full  agreement 
treatment, there is a relatively high concentration around the fair split and the proportional 
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Figure 3: Choices of an equal contribution vector in the full agreement and communication 
treatments. Treatments on the x-axis, number of subjects on the y-axis. Light grey bar 
identifies the number of subjects choosing the equal split. White bar identifies the number of 
subjects choosing an equal contribution different to the equal split.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Many public goods can be implemented as threshold public goods so it is very important to 
know how threshold public goods can be provided efficiently. The evidence suggests that 
success at providing threshold public goods is significantly below that is expected in theory. 
The  question  is  then  how to  increase  the  success  rate.  In this  paper  we  investigate  both 
theoretically and experimentally the effect of increasing criticality in threshold public goods 
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  We show that if no agreement is required criticality can be very low (Proposition 1). 
This can account for the relatively low success rate in previous experiments. We further show 
that if full agreement is required the equal split is a collectively rational recommendation if 
both player identity and the endowment are private information (Proposition 2). This suggests 
that players should be able to reach agreement and that criticality should be higher if full 
agreement is required. We thus hypothesized that success would be higher if full agreement 
was required. Our experimental results are consistent with our theoretical ones. We find that 
success  at  providing  the  public  good  is  higher  when  players  are  required  to  reach  an 
agreement, provided they have had sufficient experience. Increasing communication alone is 
not enough. We also find evidence that splitting the cost equally is a focal point that enables 
coordination.  
  We feel these results are important as they show that both criticality and focal points 
may play a very important role in public good provision. Specifically, it may be appropriate 
to require full agreement before a public good will be financed because this will increase 
perceived criticality. In real world applications, particularly as group size increases and the 
benefits of the public good become highly asymmetric, we may find situations in which it 
does  not  make  sense  to  require  all  group  members  to  agree.  It  may  still,  however,  be 
appropriate to require some level of agreement in order to increase criticality. Indeed, there 
may  be  an  optimal  level  of  agreement  required  to  trade-off  the  increase  in  perceived 




A.  Instructions for the standard treatment and standard treatment with feedback 
 
In this experiment you will make decisions, and earn an amount of money that depends on 
what you and others choose. The money will be given to you at the end of the experiment. 
Only you will know how much money you earned. 
The session will be divided into 3 parts.  Each part will last for 10 periods. In each part you 
will be organised into groups of 5.  
In each period you will receive a certain number of tokens. You will be asked to say how 
many tokens you want to allocate to a group account. The other four people in the group will 
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do the same. If the sum of tokens that each person allocates is greater than or equal to 125 
then you all receive an additional 50 tokens.  
So, your payoff for the period is: 
    If the sum of tokens allocated to the group account   125 
payoff = initial number of tokens – tokens allocated to group account + 50 
   If the sum of tokens allocated to the group account   125 
payoff = initial number of tokens 
As we said earlier, the experiment will consist of 3 parts of 10 periods each. In each part of 
the experiment the 5 people in your group will stay the same and the amount of tokens 
initially given to each person will stay the same. In each different part of the experiment there 
will be different people in your group and the amount of tokens initially given to each person 
will change. This will be indicated on your computer screen.  
At the end of each part, you will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire.  
Your total earnings will depend on your decisions in the 10 periods. You will be paid in cash 
the total amount that you earned for one of the three parts in the session. Each token will be 
worth 1p.  
B.  Instructions for the communication treatment 
 
In this experiment you will make decisions, and earn an amount of money that depends on 
what you and others choose. The money will be given to you at the end of the experiment. 
Only you will know how much money you earned. 
The session will be divided into 3 parts. Each part will last for 10 periods. In each part you 
will be organised into groups of 5.  
In each period you will receive a certain number of tokens. You will be asked to say how 
many tokens you think each person should allocate to a group account. That is, you should 
say how many tokens you want to allocate for yourself, and how many tokens you think each 
of the other four people in the group should allocate. The other four people in the group will 
do the same. If the sum of tokens that each person allocates for him or herself is greater than 
or equal to 125 then you all receive an additional 50 tokens.  
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To illustrate, consider this example (and it is just an example with arbitrary numbers) 
where each person is allocated 70 tokens. Person 1 is saying that he or she should allocate 50 
tokens to the group account, person 2 should allocate 40 tokens, and so on. In this case they 
will receive the additional 50 tokens because the sum of tokens each person allocates for him 
or herself (person 1 allocates 50, person 2 allocates 10, person 3 allocates 30, person 4 
allocates 40 and person 5 allocates 20) is greater than 125.  
  How much each person should allocate to the group account 
  Person 1  Person 2  Person 3  Person 4  Person 5 
Person 1  50  40  60  20  10 
Person 2  30  10  60  40  30 
Person 3  30  30  30  30  30 
Person 4  30  10  60  40  30 
Person 5  40  30  10  30  20 
 
To summarize: Your payoff for the period is: 
    If the sum of tokens each person allocates for him or herself to the group account   125 
payoff = initial number of tokens – tokens allocated to group account + 50 
   If the sum of tokens allocated to the group account   125 
payoff = initial number of tokens 
As we said earlier, the experiment will consist of 3 parts of 10 periods each. In each part of 
the experiment the 5 people in your group will stay the same and the amount of tokens 
initially given to each person will stay the same. In each different part of the experiment there 
will be different people in your group and the amount of tokens initially given to each person 
will change. This will be indicated on your computer screen.  
At the end of each part, you will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire.  
Your total earnings will depend on your decisions in the 10 periods. You will be paid in cash 
the total amount that you earned for one of the three parts in the session. Each token will be 
worth 1p. 
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C.  Instructions for the full agreement treatment  
 
 
In this experiment you will make decisions, and earn an amount of money that depends on 
what you and others choose. The money will be given to you at the end of the experiment. 
Only you will know how much money you earned. 
The session will be divided into 3 parts. Each part will last for 10 periods. In each part you 
will be organised into groups of 5.  
In each period you will receive a certain number of tokens. You will be asked to say how 
many tokens you think each person should allocate to a group account. That is, you should 
say how many tokens you want to allocate for yourself, and how many tokens you think each 
of the other four people in the group should allocate. The other four people in the group will 
do the same. If everyone in the group says the same thing, and the sum of tokens that each 
person allocates is greater than or equal to 125, then you all receive an additional 50 tokens.  
To illustrate, consider this example (and it is just an example with arbitrary numbers) 
where each person is allocated 70 tokens. Person 1 is saying that he or she should allocate 50 
tokens to the group account, person 2 should allocate 40 tokens, and so on. In this case they 
will not receive the additional 50 tokens because they do not all say the same thing. Person 2 
and 4 do say the same thing but it is necessary for all five to agree in order to receive the 
extra 50 tokens.   
  How much each person should allocate to the group account 
  Person 1  Person 2  Person 3  Person 4  Person 5 
Person 1  50  40  60  20  10 
Person 2  30  10  60  40  30 
Person 3  30  30  30  30  30 
Person 4  30  10  60  40  30 
Person 5  40  30  10  30  20 
 
To summarize: Your payoff for the period is: 
    If everyone says the same thing, and the sum of tokens allocated to the group account   
125 
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payoff = initial number of tokens – tokens allocated to group account + 50 
   If some do not say the same thing and/or the sum of tokens allocated to the group account 
  125 
payoff = initial number of tokens 
As we said earlier, the experiment will consist of 3 parts of 10 periods each. In each part of 
the experiment the 5 people in your group will stay the same and the amount of tokens 
initially given to each person will stay the same. In each different part of the experiment there 
will be different people in your group and the amount of tokens initially given to each person 
will change. This will be indicated on your computer screen.  
At the end of each part, you will be asked to fill in a short questionnaire.  
Your total earnings will depend on your decisions in the 10 periods. You will be paid in cash 
the total amount that you earned for one of the three parts in the session. Each token will be 
worth 1p. 
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